Sunday, 17 July 2011
All the encryption in the world wouldn't have kept Bradley Manning safe
The smallest actions can have massive repercussions. The US army's decision to enlist Bradley Manning as an intelligence analyst and deploy him to Iraq may, if he is found to have indeed been WikiLeaks' source, have led to the biggest series of military and diplomatic leaks in history.
But the reason Manning is now in military detention, awaiting court martial, perhaps ultimately lies in a smaller action still, an error thousands of email users make daily: choosing "cc" rather than "bcc".
In a plea for donations sent in 2009, that simple error led Julian Assange to inadvertently reveal the identities of WikiLeaks' first 58 supporters to each other. One, ex-hacker Adrian Lamo, decided to use this as an opportunity to test the whistleblowing site's honesty – and "leaked" the email list to WikiLeaks.
WikiLeaks passed Lamo's test, and published its own donor list in full, attracting coverage on tech and security sites across the internet.
And it seems that's how, a year later, when an isolated Bradley Manning was looking for someone to talk to, someone he could trust, he apparently happened upon Lamo.
If logs documenting the interactions between the two, released this week, are genuine, Manning introduced himself, they talked, and within minutes spilled out secret after secret about the masses of documents he'd passed to a "crazy white haired Aussie who can't seem to stay in one country very long".
The rest is history. Lamo turned over the chatlogs to US authorities. Manning was promptly arrested. Wired magazine received the chatlogs from Lamo a year ago, and published extracts. On Wednesday, more than a year later, they published them in full.
The new material in the chatlogs is revealing and disturbing. Shortly after assuring Manning of the confidentiality of their discussions – "I'm a journalist and a minister. You can pick either, and treat this as a confession or an interview (never to be published) & enjoy a modicum of legal protection" – conversation turns to WikiLeaks.
"I've been a friend to WikiLeaks," writes Lamo. "I've repeatedly asked people who download Hackers Wanted to donate. Whether I've given material, isn't material. Semi-pun intended."
"I know," Manning replies. "Actually how I noticed you."
Would Manning still have found and trusted Lamo without the leak a year before? It's impossible to say, and certainly unfair to lay the blame for Lamo's actions at WikiLeaks' door – but what the incident does underscore is that source protection is about far more than computer security.
Throughout the logs, this is a truth Lamo seems to understand while Manning does not. The two make a human connection: they discuss mutual acquaintances, LGBT issues and the Washington gay scene. Lamo even – to an extent – flirts with Manning and compliments his appearance.
If Lamo was always intending to turn Manning in, such conversation and apparent support makes difficult reading. Lamo even offers Manning apparent warning of the danger of trust: "I feel connected to everybody … like they were distant family," Manning says.
"I get that," Lamo responds. "Which is why I'm sad for the people i sometimes have to hurt."
Later, he warns "only the people you trust can fuck you – infowise".
The logs, which are impossible to authenticate but which are consistent with other sources, show Manning and Lamo were communicating via encrypted instant messaging. They discuss at length the security precautions – the anonymising tool Tor, a secure channel and an encrypted online server – Manning took when allegedly leaking the material, which Lamo praised as robust. Manning boasted "an NSA guy" on the site had noticed nothing.
Manning didn't appreciate that the electronic security of the connection between source and recipient is a tiny part of the leaking process. On the technical side, access and traffic logs on the military network are totally unaffected by the security – or lack thereof – of WikiLeaks' or any other submission network.
What is covered even less is human frailty. Manning emerges from the logs as intellectually confident, politically courageous, but personally enormously vulnerable. In need of support, Manning spoke to strangers he believed would be sympathetic.
Could Manning have spoken to WikiLeaks for this reassurance? It seems not. Julian Assange boasts of "systems" in place to ensure he can have no idea as to the identity of a source. These – as these logs corroborate – are non-existent: Manning communicated directly with Assange.
Assange was keen to keep this relationship remote, likely believing this best protects both him and his sources. "He knows very little about me," Manning wrote. "He takes source protection uber-seriously. 'Lie to me,' he says."
Assange may never have known Manning's name, his motivations, or other details. The extent of the relationship would matter little for the source's (virtually non-existent) legal protection, certainly under US law. It is difficult to see who is protected by an arm's-length relationship with regular sources, other than WikiLeaks itself.
Sources are often vulnerable. By passing secrets or documents from the organisations they are committed to – especially in all-encompassing environments like the military – they further isolate themselves from those around them. Forging a human relationship is often necessary for both source protection and often human decency.
WikiLeaks' submissions page – which still cannot accept electronic submissions – makes a series of boasts: "WikiLeaks has never revealed a source," it says. "We cannot comply with requests for information on sources because we simply do not have the information to begin with. Similarly we cannot see your real identity in any anonymised chat sessions with us."
Such statements are technically true. But what matters is not who reveals a source, but whether a source is found. Solving just one technical problem is not enough. WikiLeaks has also boasted of legal protections offered to sources. "Submitting documents to our journalists is protected by law in better democracies," it claims, reassuringly.
When the Wall Street Journal set up a site whose terms and conditions set out in detail the legal limitations of protections the site could offer, it was ridiculed on the WikiLeaks Twitter feed.
But perhaps the Lamo/Manning chatlogs offer WikiLeaks an opportunity to simplify their thinking. What matters is whether public interest whistleblowers are protected, and stay anonymous – not who reveals them.
WikiLeaks' greatest source is currently in prison. Instead of stressing no one has been caught through WikiLeaks actions, or boasting of security, WikiLeaks – and everyone else working in that world – should take a long look at what they can do better, and put the results into action.
If not, Manning may not be the last whistleblower to face the consequences.
James Ball @'The Guardian'
But the reason Manning is now in military detention, awaiting court martial, perhaps ultimately lies in a smaller action still, an error thousands of email users make daily: choosing "cc" rather than "bcc".
In a plea for donations sent in 2009, that simple error led Julian Assange to inadvertently reveal the identities of WikiLeaks' first 58 supporters to each other. One, ex-hacker Adrian Lamo, decided to use this as an opportunity to test the whistleblowing site's honesty – and "leaked" the email list to WikiLeaks.
WikiLeaks passed Lamo's test, and published its own donor list in full, attracting coverage on tech and security sites across the internet.
And it seems that's how, a year later, when an isolated Bradley Manning was looking for someone to talk to, someone he could trust, he apparently happened upon Lamo.
If logs documenting the interactions between the two, released this week, are genuine, Manning introduced himself, they talked, and within minutes spilled out secret after secret about the masses of documents he'd passed to a "crazy white haired Aussie who can't seem to stay in one country very long".
The rest is history. Lamo turned over the chatlogs to US authorities. Manning was promptly arrested. Wired magazine received the chatlogs from Lamo a year ago, and published extracts. On Wednesday, more than a year later, they published them in full.
The new material in the chatlogs is revealing and disturbing. Shortly after assuring Manning of the confidentiality of their discussions – "I'm a journalist and a minister. You can pick either, and treat this as a confession or an interview (never to be published) & enjoy a modicum of legal protection" – conversation turns to WikiLeaks.
"I've been a friend to WikiLeaks," writes Lamo. "I've repeatedly asked people who download Hackers Wanted to donate. Whether I've given material, isn't material. Semi-pun intended."
"I know," Manning replies. "Actually how I noticed you."
Would Manning still have found and trusted Lamo without the leak a year before? It's impossible to say, and certainly unfair to lay the blame for Lamo's actions at WikiLeaks' door – but what the incident does underscore is that source protection is about far more than computer security.
Throughout the logs, this is a truth Lamo seems to understand while Manning does not. The two make a human connection: they discuss mutual acquaintances, LGBT issues and the Washington gay scene. Lamo even – to an extent – flirts with Manning and compliments his appearance.
If Lamo was always intending to turn Manning in, such conversation and apparent support makes difficult reading. Lamo even offers Manning apparent warning of the danger of trust: "I feel connected to everybody … like they were distant family," Manning says.
"I get that," Lamo responds. "Which is why I'm sad for the people i sometimes have to hurt."
Later, he warns "only the people you trust can fuck you – infowise".
The logs, which are impossible to authenticate but which are consistent with other sources, show Manning and Lamo were communicating via encrypted instant messaging. They discuss at length the security precautions – the anonymising tool Tor, a secure channel and an encrypted online server – Manning took when allegedly leaking the material, which Lamo praised as robust. Manning boasted "an NSA guy" on the site had noticed nothing.
Manning didn't appreciate that the electronic security of the connection between source and recipient is a tiny part of the leaking process. On the technical side, access and traffic logs on the military network are totally unaffected by the security – or lack thereof – of WikiLeaks' or any other submission network.
What is covered even less is human frailty. Manning emerges from the logs as intellectually confident, politically courageous, but personally enormously vulnerable. In need of support, Manning spoke to strangers he believed would be sympathetic.
Could Manning have spoken to WikiLeaks for this reassurance? It seems not. Julian Assange boasts of "systems" in place to ensure he can have no idea as to the identity of a source. These – as these logs corroborate – are non-existent: Manning communicated directly with Assange.
Assange was keen to keep this relationship remote, likely believing this best protects both him and his sources. "He knows very little about me," Manning wrote. "He takes source protection uber-seriously. 'Lie to me,' he says."
Assange may never have known Manning's name, his motivations, or other details. The extent of the relationship would matter little for the source's (virtually non-existent) legal protection, certainly under US law. It is difficult to see who is protected by an arm's-length relationship with regular sources, other than WikiLeaks itself.
Sources are often vulnerable. By passing secrets or documents from the organisations they are committed to – especially in all-encompassing environments like the military – they further isolate themselves from those around them. Forging a human relationship is often necessary for both source protection and often human decency.
WikiLeaks' submissions page – which still cannot accept electronic submissions – makes a series of boasts: "WikiLeaks has never revealed a source," it says. "We cannot comply with requests for information on sources because we simply do not have the information to begin with. Similarly we cannot see your real identity in any anonymised chat sessions with us."
Such statements are technically true. But what matters is not who reveals a source, but whether a source is found. Solving just one technical problem is not enough. WikiLeaks has also boasted of legal protections offered to sources. "Submitting documents to our journalists is protected by law in better democracies," it claims, reassuringly.
When the Wall Street Journal set up a site whose terms and conditions set out in detail the legal limitations of protections the site could offer, it was ridiculed on the WikiLeaks Twitter feed.
But perhaps the Lamo/Manning chatlogs offer WikiLeaks an opportunity to simplify their thinking. What matters is whether public interest whistleblowers are protected, and stay anonymous – not who reveals them.
WikiLeaks' greatest source is currently in prison. Instead of stressing no one has been caught through WikiLeaks actions, or boasting of security, WikiLeaks – and everyone else working in that world – should take a long look at what they can do better, and put the results into action.
If not, Manning may not be the last whistleblower to face the consequences.
James Ball @'The Guardian'
The 'Lord' Monckton roadshow
Listen Now
Download Audio
@'ABC'
Don't forget to watch this to show what a charlatan this man is...
ChrisBryantMP Chris Bryant
So coulson was on £475k before election and £140k at downing street. Something doesn't add up
Peter Jennings - Ecstasy Rising (200?)
The rise of Ecstasy is a major event in drug history. If current trends continue, 1.8 million Americans will try Ecstasy for the first time in 2004; only marijuana will attract more new users. Overwhelming, positive word of mouth has made Ecstasy a nightmare for drug controllers. On a special edition of 'Primetime Thursday' Peter Jennings tells the epic story of Ecstasy that has never been heard.
Saturday, 16 July 2011
Release the Lachlan!
Crises like this one are what drive Murdoch, John Lanchester wrote in the London Review of Books in 2004. The genocidal tyrant loves taking action at "the point when everything seems about to be lost." Lanchester cites News Corp.'s 1990 debt crisis, in which Murdoch almost lost the company; his relocation of his British papers to Wapping; and the financial disaster resulting from borrowing money from Michael Milken as prime examples of Rupert's tightrope walking. More recently, Murdoch had to scramble all of News Corp.'s fire engines and squad cars to repel John Malone, who had purchased enough of the company's stock on the sly to threaten the Murdoch family's control...
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Jack Shafer @'Slate'
Mark Twain’s ‘Advice to Little Girls’
(Click to enlarge)
It is difficult for us to imagine what a strange impression Advice to Little Girls, a children’s story by Mark Twain, must have had on its audience when it was written in 1865 and eventually published as part of The 30,000 Dollar Bequest and Other Stories. American children’s literature in those days was mostly didactic, addressed to some imaginary reader—an ideal girl or boy, upon reading the story, would immediately adopt its heroes as role models. He did not squat down to be heard and understood by children, but asked them to stand on their tiptoes—to absorb the kind of language and humor suitable for adults.
The unexpected idea to illustrate Twain’s text came from the editor Bianca Lazzaro of Donzelli Editore in Rome, who also translated the text in to Italian. I still feel envious that she originated it because I’m always trying to find unusual or provocative subjects for my children’s books.
Trying to follow Twain’s style, I wanted to make something along the lines of a scrap-book or an album that you could buy in any paper-goods store at the time. Children used these small albums to paste in various curious objects, or for drawing, or just for doodling.
The only missing elements in the design of the book are stains and dog-ears, but I hope those will come with time.
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Vladimir Radunsky @"NYR'
Beautiful!
Exorcists meet in Poland, tackle vampires
Held at Poland's Roman Catholic Jasna Gora monastery, home to the venerated Black Madonna icon, this year's congress "examines the current fashion for vampirism in Europe and the world-over, schizophrenia and other mental disorders as well as the devil's deceit during exorcism," according to the monastery's radio station.
Also attending are "priests and lay people who work with exorcists or who are themselves practitioners in cases which do not involve possession but rather other forms of harassment by evil spirits," Polish exorcist, Father Andrzej Grefkowicz was quoted as saying.
Hailing from India, world-renowned exorcist Father Rufus Pereira as well as chief exorcist of the Archdiocese of Vienna Larry Hogan are among the participants, the radio reported. The unusual meeting is held once every two years.
The Jasna Gora monastery's venerated Black Madonna icon is believed by many Poles to work miracles.
Legend has it that it was painted by the apostle Saint Luke on a table top from the home of the Holy Family, according to the Jasna Gora website. Records suggest the icon arrived in Poland during the 14th century.With around 90 percent of the population declaring themselves Roman Catholic, Poland remains one of Europe's most devout countries.
Rebekah Brooks' resignation - video analysis
Matt Wells assesses Rebekah Brooks' decision to step down as chief executive of News International and what it could mean for the Murdoch empire.
@'The Guardian'
@'The Guardian'
The Wizened of Oz changes his tune somewhat...
We are sorry."We are sorry" is written in huge letters at the top, and Rupert Murdoch's signature rounds off the note.
The News of the World was in the business of holding others to account. It failed when it came to itself.
We are sorry for the serious wrongdoing that occurred.
We are deeply sorry for the hurt suffered by the individuals affected.
We regret not acting faster to sort things out.
I realise that simply apologising is not enough.
Our business was founded on the idea that a free and open press should be a positive force in society. We need to live up to this.
In the coming days, as we take further concrete steps to resolve these issues and make amends for the damage they have caused, you will hear more from us.
Sincerely,
Rupert Murdoch
For contrast, here are the relevant passages of that final NoW editorial, which, as well as apologising, emphasises the paper's "high standards" and its journalists' "skill, dedication, honour and integrity" and asks to be judged "on all our years":
We praised high standards, we demanded high standards but, as we are now only too painfully aware, for a period of a few years up to 2006 some who worked for us, or in our name, fell shamefully short of those standards.Via
Quite simply, we lost our way.
Phones were hacked, and for that this newspaper is truly sorry.
There is no justification for this appalling wrongdoing.
No justification for the pain caused to victims, nor for the deep stain it has left on a great history.
Yet when this outrage has been atoned, we hope history will eventually judge us on all our years.
The staff of this paper are people of skill, dedication, honour and integrity bearing the pain for the past misdeeds of a few others.
And as a small step on the long road to making some amends, all profits from the sale of this final edition will be split equally between three charities: Barnardo's, the Forces Children's Trust, and military projects at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham Charity.
Once upon a time in Rafah
The award was given to freelance political cartoonist Carlos Latuff. His work deals with a number of themes including anti-globalization and ant-capitalism. He himself has described his own work as controversial.
In the cartoon the Israeli child addresses rhe Palestinian child saying ' My father told me that you Arabs are evil terrorist animals. In response the Palestinian child says ' My father told me nothing, he was murdered by yours. Simple but effective.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Latuff
@'teifidancer'
(Thanx Dave!)
The CIA's Secret Sites in Somalia
Nestled in a back corner of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport is a sprawling walled compound run by the Central Intelligence Agency. Set on the coast of the Indian Ocean, the facility looks like a small gated community, with more than a dozen buildings behind large protective walls and secured by guard towers at each of its four corners. Adjacent to the compound are eight large metal hangars, and the CIA has its own aircraft at the airport. The site, which airport officials and Somali intelligence sources say was completed four months ago, is guarded by Somali soldiers, but the Americans control access. At the facility, the CIA runs a counterterrorism training program for Somali intelligence agents and operatives aimed at building an indigenous strike force capable of snatch operations and targeted “combat” operations against members of Al Shabab, an Islamic militant group with close ties to Al Qaeda.
As part of its expanding counterterrorism program in Somalia, the CIA also uses a secret prison buried in the basement of Somalia’s National Security Agency (NSA) headquarters, where prisoners suspected of being Shabab members or of having links to the group are held. Some of the prisoners have been snatched off the streets of Kenya and rendered by plane to Mogadishu. While the underground prison is officially run by the Somali NSA, US intelligence personnel pay the salaries of intelligence agents and also directly interrogate prisoners. The existence of both facilities and the CIA role was uncovered by The Nation during an extensive on-the-ground investigation in Mogadishu. Among the sources who provided information for this story are senior Somali intelligence officials; senior members of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG); former prisoners held at the underground prison; and several well-connected Somali analysts and militia leaders, some of whom have worked with US agents, including those from the CIA. A US official, who confirmed the existence of both sites, told The Nation, “It makes complete sense to have a strong counterterrorism partnership” with the Somali government.
The CIA presence in Mogadishu is part of Washington’s intensifying counterterrorism focus on Somalia, which includes targeted strikes by US Special Operations forces, drone attacks and expanded surveillance operations. The US agents “are here full time,” a senior Somali intelligence official told me. At times, he said, there are as many as thirty of them in Mogadishu, but he stressed that those working with the Somali NSA do not conduct operations; rather, they advise and train Somali agents. “In this environment, it’s very tricky. They want to help us, but the situation is not allowing them to do [it] however they want. They are not in control of the politics, they are not in control of the security,” he adds. “They are not controlling the environment like Afghanistan and Iraq. In Somalia, the situation is fluid, the situation is changing, personalities changing.”
According to well-connected Somali sources, the CIA is reluctant to deal directly with Somali political leaders, who are regarded by US officials as corrupt and untrustworthy. Instead, the United States has Somali intelligence agents on its payroll. Somali sources with knowledge of the program described the agents as lining up to receive $200 monthly cash payments from Americans. “They support us in a big way financially,” says the senior Somali intelligence official. “They are the largest [funder] by far...”
As part of its expanding counterterrorism program in Somalia, the CIA also uses a secret prison buried in the basement of Somalia’s National Security Agency (NSA) headquarters, where prisoners suspected of being Shabab members or of having links to the group are held. Some of the prisoners have been snatched off the streets of Kenya and rendered by plane to Mogadishu. While the underground prison is officially run by the Somali NSA, US intelligence personnel pay the salaries of intelligence agents and also directly interrogate prisoners. The existence of both facilities and the CIA role was uncovered by The Nation during an extensive on-the-ground investigation in Mogadishu. Among the sources who provided information for this story are senior Somali intelligence officials; senior members of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG); former prisoners held at the underground prison; and several well-connected Somali analysts and militia leaders, some of whom have worked with US agents, including those from the CIA. A US official, who confirmed the existence of both sites, told The Nation, “It makes complete sense to have a strong counterterrorism partnership” with the Somali government.
The CIA presence in Mogadishu is part of Washington’s intensifying counterterrorism focus on Somalia, which includes targeted strikes by US Special Operations forces, drone attacks and expanded surveillance operations. The US agents “are here full time,” a senior Somali intelligence official told me. At times, he said, there are as many as thirty of them in Mogadishu, but he stressed that those working with the Somali NSA do not conduct operations; rather, they advise and train Somali agents. “In this environment, it’s very tricky. They want to help us, but the situation is not allowing them to do [it] however they want. They are not in control of the politics, they are not in control of the security,” he adds. “They are not controlling the environment like Afghanistan and Iraq. In Somalia, the situation is fluid, the situation is changing, personalities changing.”
According to well-connected Somali sources, the CIA is reluctant to deal directly with Somali political leaders, who are regarded by US officials as corrupt and untrustworthy. Instead, the United States has Somali intelligence agents on its payroll. Somali sources with knowledge of the program described the agents as lining up to receive $200 monthly cash payments from Americans. “They support us in a big way financially,” says the senior Somali intelligence official. “They are the largest [funder] by far...”
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Jeremy Scahill @'The Nation'
How the U.S. Government uses its media servants to attack real journalism
Friday, 15 July 2011
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