Assuming the U.S. Congress authorises them, Washington (together with
some allies) soon will launch military strikes against Syrian regime
targets. If so, it will have taken such action for reasons largely
divorced from the interests of the Syrian people. The administration
has cited the need to punish, deter and prevent use of chemical weapons -
a defensible goal, though Syrians have suffered from far deadlier mass
atrocities during the course of the conflict without this prompting much
collective action in their defence. The administration also refers to
the need, given President Obama's asserted "redline" against use of
chemical weapons, to protect Washington's credibility - again an
understandable objective though unlikely to resonate much with Syrians.
Quite apart from talk of outrage, deterrence and restoring U.S.
credibility, the priority must be the welfare of the Syrian people.
Whether or not military strikes are ordered, this only can be achieved
through imposition of a sustained ceasefire and widely accepted
political transition.
To precisely gauge in advance the impact of a U.S. military attack,
regardless of its scope and of efforts to carefully calibrate it, by
definition is a fool's errand. In a conflict that has settled into a
deadly if familiar pattern - and in a region close to boiling point - it
inevitably will introduce a powerful element of uncertainty.
Consequences almost certainly will be unpredictable. Still, several
observations can be made about what it might and might not do:
- A military attack will not, nor can it, be met with even minimal
international consensus; in this sense, the attempt to come up with
solid evidence of regime use of chemical weapons, however necessary,
also is futile. Given the false pretenses that informed the 2003 U.S.
invasion of Iraq and, since then, regional and international
polarisation coupled with the dynamics of the Syrian conflict itself,
proof put forward by the U.S. will be insufficient to sway disbelievers
and skepticism will be widespread.
- It might discourage future use of chemical weapons by signaling
even harsher punishment in the event of recidivism - an important
achievement in and of itself. Should the regime find itself fighting
for its survival, however, that consideration might not weigh heavily.
Elements within the opposition also might be tempted to use such weapons
and then blame the regime, precisely in order to provoke further U.S.
intervention.
- It could trigger violent escalation within Syria as the regime
might exact revenge on rebels and rebel-held areas, while the opposition
seeks to seize the opportunity to make its own gains.
- Major regional or international escalation (such as retaliatory
actions by the regime, Iran or Hizbollah, notably against Israel) is
possible but probably not likely given the risks involved, though this
could depend on the scope of the strikes.
- Military action, which the U.S. has stated will not aim at
provoking the regime's collapse, might not even have an enduring effect
on the balance of power on the ground. Indeed, the regime could
register a propaganda victory, claiming it had stood fast against the
U.S. and rallying domestic and regional opinion around an anti-Western,
anti-imperialist mantra.
Ultimately, the principal question regarding a possible military
strike is whether diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict can be
reenergized in its aftermath. Smart money says they will not: in the
wake of an attack they condemn as illegal and illegitimate, the regime
and its allies arguably will not be in a mood to negotiate with the U.S.
Carefully calibrating the strike to hurt enough to change their
calculations but not enough to prompt retaliation or impede diplomacy is
appealing in theory. In practice, it almost certainly is not
feasible.
Whether or not the U.S. chooses to launch a military offensive, its
responsibility should be to try to optimize chances of a diplomatic
breakthrough. This requires a two-fold effort lacking to date:
developing a realistic compromise political offer as well as genuinely
reaching out to both Russia and Iran in a manner capable of eliciting
their interest - rather than investing in a prolonged conflict that has a
seemingly bottomless capacity to escalate.
In this spirit, the U.S. should present - and Syria's allies should
seriously and constructively consider - a proposal based on the
following elements:
- It is imperative to end this war. The escalation, regional
instability and international entanglement its persistence unavoidably
stimulates serve nobody's interest.
- The only exit is political. That requires far-reaching
concessions and a lowering of demands from all parties. The sole viable
outcome is a compromise that protects the interests of all Syrian
constituencies and reflects rather than alters the regional strategic
balance;
- The Syrian crisis presents an important opportunity to test
whether the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran can work together on
regional issues to restore stability;
- A viable political outcome in Syria cannot be one in which the
current leadership remains indefinitely in power but, beyond that, the
U.S. can be flexible with regards to timing and specific modalities;
- The U.S. is keen to avoid collapse of the Syrian state and the
resulting political vacuum. The goal should thus be a transition that
builds on existing institutions rather than replaces them. This is true
notably with respect to the army;
- Priority must be given to ensuring that no component of Syrian
society is targeted for retaliation, discrimination or marginalisation
in the context of a negotiated settlement.
Such a proposal should then form the basis for renewed efforts by
Lakhdar Brahimi, the joint United Nations/Arab League envoy, and lead to
rapid convening of a Geneva II conference.
Debate over a possible strike - its wisdom, preferred scope and
legitimacy in the absence of UN Security Council approval - has obscured
and distracted from what ought to be the overriding international
preoccupation: how to revitalise the search for a political settlement.
Discussions about its legality aside, any contemplated military action
should be judged based on whether it advances that goal or further
postpones it.
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