Ten years ago, we were right, but it didn't matter.
Ten years ago, within hours after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, it was clear that the architects of US foreign policy were going to use the events to justify war in Central Asia and the Middle East. And within hours, those of us critical of those policies began to articulate principled and practical arguments against the mad rush to war.
We were right then, but it didn't matter. Neither the general public nor policymakers were interested in principled or practical arguments.
The public wanted revenge, and the policymakers seized an opportunity to attempt to expand US power.
We were right, but the wars came.
The destructive capacity of the US military meant quick ''victory'' that just as quickly proved illusory. As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dragged on, each year it became clearer that the position staked out by the early opponents of the wars was correct. That mad rush to war had not only been illegal and immoral, but it was a failure on whatever pragmatic criteria one might use. The US military has killed some of the people who were targeting the United States and destroyed some of their infrastructure and organization, but we are neither stronger nor safer as a result. The ability to dominate militarily proved to be both inadequate and transitory, as critics predicted.
On the tenth anniversary of 9/11, it is tempting to want to linger on the part about ''being right,'' but it's more important to focus on why ''it didn't matter'' because we are still right, and it still doesn't matter. Understanding this is necessary to shape a realistic political program for the next decade - as bad as the past ten years have been, the next ten are likely to be worse, and we need to speak bluntly about these political/economic/social realities in the United States.
What We Did, and Didn't, Accomplish
When I say ''we were right,'' I count in the ''we'' those people who can be described as ''anti-empire,'' rather than just ''anti-war.'' This is how I described that position in an interview:
The broad outlines of US foreign policy since WWII have remained unchanged: A desire to deepen and extend US power around the world, especially in the most strategically crucial regions such as the energy-rich Middle East; always with an eye on derailing the attempts of any Third World society to pursue a course of independent development outside the US sphere; and containing the possibility of challenges to US hegemony from other powerful states. The Bush administration policy is a departure from recent policy in terms of strategy and tactics, and perhaps also in the intensity of ideological fanaticism.... None of this is unprecedented; all of it is dangerous and
disturbing.
The folks at the core of the resistance to the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq mostly shared that critique, seeing both the continuities and the distinctive threat of the moment. Others spoke out and organized, but offered no framework for understanding the invasions - liberal Democrats who prefer less brutal methods of empire maintenance or simply reject wars started by Republican presidents; isolationists, including some Republicans, who think that reducing military adventures will preserve US affluence; and folks who identify as pacifist and reject any war.
Although the anti-empire analysis has continued to be the most compelling explanation of US policy and its effects, anti-empire movements remain small. The movements that have seen some growth in recent years - the Tea Party and right-wing libertarianism - include some anti-war elements, but repudiate a left critique, of empire or anything else...
Continue reading
