Originally created for The Low End Theory Podcast. Especially made for freeway driving
Wednesday, 20 July 2011
Murdoch’s Nemesis
“F--k me,” he said. “I’ve got Rupert Murdoch in front of me in a week.”
Just days before, News of the World, News International’s flagship tabloid, had ceased to exist, its office in the company’s gated complex near the Tower of London sealed off as a crime scene. That morning, Britain’s top cops had been grilled in Parliament over their failure to properly investigate the news conglomerate, and suspicions of corruption and cover-up were running high. It was easy to forget that for the last two years, Watson had appeared to many as a lonely and possibly unhinged figure as he railed against the apparent lawlessness of the Murdoch empire. While British politicians and media ignored the issue, Watson hammered away at it in speeches and parliamentary sessions, in the process becoming its public face—which was not necessarily a good image to have.
Some friends, Watson admitted, “probably said, ‘This is getting a bit obsessive.‘”
Stocky and bespectacled, Watson doesn’t cut the figure of crusading scourge. But with the News International executives heading to his committee room, the M.P. has become one of the scandal’s most lauded heroes. On Sunday, the British newspaper The Guardian called him Rupert Murdoch’s “tormenter in chief...”
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Mike Giglio @'The Daily Beast'
Anticensorship software to help rebels get the word out
State-backed internet censorship is the method of choice for countries that want to crack down on citizens spreading messages of revolution online. But now dissidents have a tool to help them fight back.
Telex, developed by computer scientists at the University of Michigan, US and the University of Waterloo, Canada, transmits information to blocked websites by piggybacking on uncensored connections with the aid of friendly foreign internet service providers (ISPs).
Dissidents install the Telex client, perhaps from a USB stick smuggled over the border. They then make a secure connection to an uncensored site outside of the censor's network - nearly any site that uses password logins will do. The connection looks normal, but Telex tags the traffic with a secret key.
Foreign ISPs in the network between the client and destination site can look for these tags and redirect the connection to an anonymising service such as a proxy server, which allows users to connect from one location while appearing to be elsewhere. Using Telex is more robust than using such servers directly, as censors can easily block access to a proxy once it is discovered.
The researchers have tested the system by watching YouTube videos in Beijing, China, despite the site being blocked in that country, but they say it's not yet ready for real users. One barrier might be the need for foreign ISPs to install Telex software. "Widespread ISP deployment might require incentives from governments," suggest the researchers - something that the US government might be interested in given its plans to provide rebels with an "internet in a suitcase". Telex also wouldn't be able to help during an Egypt-style disconnect, as dissidents must at least be able to connect to uncensored sites.
Jacob Aron @'New Scientist'
Telex, developed by computer scientists at the University of Michigan, US and the University of Waterloo, Canada, transmits information to blocked websites by piggybacking on uncensored connections with the aid of friendly foreign internet service providers (ISPs).
Dissidents install the Telex client, perhaps from a USB stick smuggled over the border. They then make a secure connection to an uncensored site outside of the censor's network - nearly any site that uses password logins will do. The connection looks normal, but Telex tags the traffic with a secret key.
Foreign ISPs in the network between the client and destination site can look for these tags and redirect the connection to an anonymising service such as a proxy server, which allows users to connect from one location while appearing to be elsewhere. Using Telex is more robust than using such servers directly, as censors can easily block access to a proxy once it is discovered.
The researchers have tested the system by watching YouTube videos in Beijing, China, despite the site being blocked in that country, but they say it's not yet ready for real users. One barrier might be the need for foreign ISPs to install Telex software. "Widespread ISP deployment might require incentives from governments," suggest the researchers - something that the US government might be interested in given its plans to provide rebels with an "internet in a suitcase". Telex also wouldn't be able to help during an Egypt-style disconnect, as dissidents must at least be able to connect to uncensored sites.
Jacob Aron @'New Scientist'
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