Friday, 20 May 2011
The seductive power of the U.S. military
You get the point. Towel off and read on...
HERE
Man behind 'Great Firewall of China' pelted with eggs
The unusually daring protest comes as China's leaders move to tighten internet controls following the wave of Jasmine revolutions in the Middle East, and indicated the depths of frustration felt by some young Chinese towards the censorship.
Four students apparently sought out Mr Fang as he gave a talk at the Computer Sciences Department of Wuhan University in central China, pre-arming themselves with eggs purchased for the occasion at a nearby market, according to their own account on Twitter.
"I definitely hit Fang. As for whether there are pictures will depends on the two students," read a post by one of the students, @hanunyi, "I came by myself. It was not difficult to hit with my shoes but a little bit harder to target him really successfully." Two others, @zfangzhou and @yinhm, said the protest has been organised spontaneously after hearing word that Mr Fang was on the campus.
"It was not prepared in advance. We heard the news [of Mr Fang's presence] at noon. We then went to the agricultural market near the computer department. My friend bought eggs and went to scope out the place, where we meet @hanunyi
"We were are thinking of doing it ourselves and then unfortunately noticed that our professor was there and our graduate supervisor, and we immediately lost courage. Then we met @hanunyi, he was really courageous and did the thing directly." Photographs were also posted online purportedly showing the four holding the eggs that were allegedly thrown at Mr Fang and, later, the bare feet of @hanunyi after the protest which echoed that of an Iraqi journalist who hurled his shoes at George W Bush in Baghdad in December 2008. The identity of @hanyunyi is unclear, however his Twitter account uses a picture of the jailed artist Ai Weiwei, with the sentence "If you don't want to release Ai Weiwei, then just pull me in too." Another photograph posted online appeared to show police or security guards at the scene, but messages posted on Twitter indicated the students had managed to leave the campus before being caught. Other students Tweeted that the police vans were on campus.
Police said they were seeking a man following the incident.
The protest is the first known physical attack on Mr Fang, however last December he was subjected to the virtual equivalent of an assault after online users discovered he had opened an account on Sina Weibo, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter.
Mr Fang, the principal of Beijing University of Posts & Telecommunications, was forced to close the account hours later after being deluged by thousands of incensed 'netizens' who left expletive-laden messages denouncing him as an agent of repression.
China has some of the harshest censorship rules in the world, blocking many overseas sites such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube and spending billions of pounds and man-hours policing the internet for information deemed to be inimical to the ideal of a "harmonious society".
The attack on Mr Fang sent the censors scrambling to delete jubilant posts on Weibo in which online users offered to shower gifts on the two protestors from expensive meals to cash prizes, with one user even offering herself to the 'heroes'.
When censors at Sina Weibo were forced to declare searches for "Fang Binxing" illegal, the irony was not lost on many users. "Kind of poetic, really," observed one Twitter user, "The blocker, blocked."
When an account of the protest was posted on China's Netease web portal by a blogger using an alias, other online users rushed to offer "prizes".
One promised the use of a luxury flat in Shanghai for three months - worth GBP3,000 – while another offered the students "10 VPNs" - the relatively costly Virtual Proxy Network software used by students to "leap the Wall" and circumvent internet censorship.
"I offer a package of tourist tickets for Suzhou gardens to those who hit Fang successfully," said another, while a third from the US, said "I offer a pair of Nike shoes to the one that threw his smelly shoes at Fang."
Michael Anti, a veteran Chinese journalist and blogger who has campaigned for free speech in China, said the reaction of China's online users to the stunt showed how deeply many resented Chinese internet controls.
"The netizens were happy to see this scene. The Great Firewall not only blocks political content, but also prevents the most intelligent minds in China getting useful, up-to-date information from the outside world in science, technology, and other non-political spheres.
"We Chinese have now become second-class citizens in the Internet Age. A whole generation is suffering from the lack of freedom of information, and definitely, Fang should be blamed for this."
The idea for the protest appears to have been originally planted by a Hong Kong-based activist and freelance writer Jia Jia, who posted Mr Fang’s whereabouts online at around 11am and urged students go prepared to show their displeasure towards him.
“All persons with lofty ideas are welcomed to be present,” wrote the activist, “The host won’t offer tomatoes, horse sh*t, 50 cent coins, rotten eggs, etc, so students please prepare them by yourselves.”
Mr Jia said he was surprised at the students’ response to his post which was re-Tweeted on student bulletin boards, but said the reaction showed the high levels of anger among the students at internet controls.
“It reflected their dissatisfaction about current internet controls and it showed people’s willingness to make an effort and pay a cost to break down internet controls,” Mr Jia said in a phone interview with The Telegraph.
Concerns were mounting last night about what would now happen to @hanunyi who is a student at the Huazhong University of Science and Technology in Wuhan, according to Mr Jia, who said he feared he would be charged with causing a disturbance.
Isaac Mao, the man who wrote China’s first blog in 2002, said he had exchanged several direct messages with @hanunyi via Twitter immediately after the incident, said he was now concerned for the protestor.
“He sent a message after this happened saying that he felt this was something he needed to do, that he had not prepared it in advance, but he said he had not been at all prepared for the strength of the netizens’ response,” Mr Mao told The Telegraph.
“This is China. There could be two very different responses by the authorities. They could be lenient, and play the episode down so that more people do not learn about it, or they could not.”
Peter Foster @'The Telegraph'
Future Vintage 035 @ Red Light Radio 05-17-2011 (Sun Ra special for the Sun Radio Dedication Night at Toko MC May 21st)
Sun Ra - Interstellar Low-ways
Sun Ra - On Jupiter
Madvillain - Light of the Past
Sun Ra - Third Planet (live)
Alan Lomax compilation - Jesus on the Mainline
Sun Ra - Images
Mo Kolours - Drum Talking
Sun Ra - Interplanetary Music
Sun Ra - Sleeping Beauty
Sun Ra - Love in Outer Space
Africa Hitech - Light the Way
Sun Ra - Somebody Elses Idea (live)
Sun Ra - On Jupiter
Madvillain - Light of the Past
Sun Ra - Third Planet (live)
Alan Lomax compilation - Jesus on the Mainline
Sun Ra - Images
Mo Kolours - Drum Talking
Sun Ra - Interplanetary Music
Sun Ra - Sleeping Beauty
Sun Ra - Love in Outer Space
Africa Hitech - Light the Way
Sun Ra - Somebody Elses Idea (live)
Sonic Youth rare live tracks
Scream (Recorded Live, Rolle, Switzerland 6/83) [2:20] *
"Plato's Cave, Rothko's Chapel, Lincoln's Profile" (full version)
Performed with Mike Kelley, Live at Artist's Space, New York City, December 5, 1986 with Molly Cleator and Adam Rudolf. Recorded by C. Parkinson.
NOTES
* From Tellus #1 (1983)
@'UbuWeb'
"Plato's Cave, Rothko's Chapel, Lincoln's Profile" (full version)
Performed with Mike Kelley, Live at Artist's Space, New York City, December 5, 1986 with Molly Cleator and Adam Rudolf. Recorded by C. Parkinson.
NOTES
* From Tellus #1 (1983)
How to Read Freedom House's Censorship Circumvention Report
Freedom House released Leaping Over the Firewall last month, a report covering two angles: details about Internet censorship in Azerbaijan, Burma, China, and Iran; and the use of circumvention software in those countries to bypass Internet censorship. As government censorship of the Internet spreads worldwide, research about the technology, norms and policies determining the flow of information is going to be increasingly vital.
Leaping Over the Firewall blends a non-technical survey method with some lightweight lab testing of circumvention software. This approach is unique, but has some limitations that affect how the report should be read in order to avoid confusion.
The report isn't about how to communicate securely and safely. Internet filtering and blocking is increasingly combined with Internet surveillance, partly because tools capable of surveilling Internet traffic can help better identify what and how to block and filter. A software tool can provide circumvention but still be well-short of providing any kind of meaningful security against a government. The report does surface the complexity of making security decisions around using the Internet, but the report also makes notable misuses of "security" throughout.
Here is an example of "security" being used irresponsibly:
Tor is software that a user can run to give themselves a relatively strong guarantee of anonymity online.1 Tor's design allows it to work as circumvention software, but its value extends beyond getting access to blocked or filtered information—Tor's design is intended to give its users anonymity by taking measures to defeat network surveillance and traffic analysis.
A reader glossing over the report might see that Tor received 2 stars in security, and make the unfortunate judgment that Tor shouldn't be used on that basis. What this graphic actually means is that Freedom House's survey respondents—on a purely anecdotal, non-random sampled basis—evaluated Tor to present "operational problems" while having fewer technical support resources available.2
Everywhere else in the report, this category of poll question is called "security and support," but for some reason, in the box summary, it's inappropriately reduced to just "security." Looking at the questions, the category referred to as "security" in the boxes actually represents survey respondents' views on usability and support—essentially whether or not users had trouble using or understanding the software, and whether or not there were resources to help them understand what was wrong. Usability and support are certainly important characteristics, but describing it as "security" is a gross misnomer.
The security ratings for the circumvention tools don't appear to heavily weight crucial elements of the design of the circumvention software system as a whole—in particular, whether or not the operators of the circumvention software have tracking or data collection capabilities over users of the software, and whether or not the source code of the tool has been made available for analysis.3 One baseline factor in evaluating the security of a piece of software is whether or not the widest possible community of knowledgable technologists has had the opportunity to identify defects, from design and architecture, down to the code itself. From a computer security perspective, most (if not all) software has exploitable flaws—taking advantage of those flaws to disrupt or control a piece of technology is more or less a matter of time and resources. And so there's a general understanding that any tool whose source code hasn't been made widely available doesn't have the benefit of having allowed broad research into the ways that it could be exploited, making claims of security essentially impossible to validate.
The report features a decision-making flowchart, where the resulting recommendation of software rests upon whether or not users are seeking to receive information or upload information; and also whether or not they're interested in speed or security. But without sufficient context—details buried in the written descriptions about software—users are being encouraged to conduct a risk assessment without the broad range of knowledge that may be necessary to make a truly improved decision about which circumvention software to use, and how to use it.
A second goal is to help "tools developers to learn how their tools are perceived by the users in these countries, and what enhancement would be beneficial." In this regard, the report could be beneficial if tools developers take the anecdotal survey findings and seek additional evidence to see if there are patterns that need addressing.
Ultimately, the Leaping Over the Firewall report seems to face a difficult internal contradiction: approaching circumvention tools from a largely non-technical perspective. The blocking of Internet content by governments and the circumvention of those blocks is a deeply technical topic where the adage that "code is law and architecture is policy" are powerfully validated.
However, there is value in attempting to identify and quantify what end users of circumvention software experience, and Freedom House's general finding that users will trade security for operational speed raises a number of vital questions about exactly why that choice is being made. Under what conditions does a user switch from a slow, highly secure channel to a faster, less secure channel? And for activists, when is an appropriate time to make that decision, and when should speed be sacrificed for security? The answer to these questions will help tool developers, activists, and users understand how to continue to have free expression on the Internet even and especially when faced with censorship.
Leaping Over the Firewall blends a non-technical survey method with some lightweight lab testing of circumvention software. This approach is unique, but has some limitations that affect how the report should be read in order to avoid confusion.
What are the report's goals?
The report is about circumvention tools—software used by Internet users to get around blocking and filtering technologies set up by governments. More specifically, the report is a vehicle for two very different sets of information:- the results of non-probability sampled surveys about users of circumvention software, distributed to and collected from users in Azerbaijan, Burma, China, and Iran; and
- the results of lab-based testing of circumvention software.
Freedom House conducted this product review to help internet users in selected internet-restricted environments assess a range of circumvention tools and choose the tools that are best suited to their needs. [...] By providing this assessment, Freedom House seeks to make circumvention tools more accessible in countries where they are needed, thereby countering internet censorship. The evaluation is also useful for tools developers to learn how their tools are perceived by the users in these countries, and what enhancement would be beneficial.
What are the report's limitations?
The survey results are not representative. Note that the survey was only issued to users in four countries, and that those users were not randomly sampled. Understandably, safety and operational considerations limit the ability of researchers to conduct a more robust survey—but it also means that the findings in this report should not be treated as generally applicable. Internet censorship takes place in many countries apart from Iran, China, Azerbaijan, and Burma. China and Iran in particular are understood to have more sophisticated, aggressive Internet censorship operations than other countries. Readers must be careful to avoid over-generalizing the report's results to other countries that practice censorship of the Internet, but differ in userbase, politics, technology understanding, and more.The report isn't about how to communicate securely and safely. Internet filtering and blocking is increasingly combined with Internet surveillance, partly because tools capable of surveilling Internet traffic can help better identify what and how to block and filter. A software tool can provide circumvention but still be well-short of providing any kind of meaningful security against a government. The report does surface the complexity of making security decisions around using the Internet, but the report also makes notable misuses of "security" throughout.
Here is an example of "security" being used irresponsibly:
Tor is software that a user can run to give themselves a relatively strong guarantee of anonymity online.1 Tor's design allows it to work as circumvention software, but its value extends beyond getting access to blocked or filtered information—Tor's design is intended to give its users anonymity by taking measures to defeat network surveillance and traffic analysis.
A reader glossing over the report might see that Tor received 2 stars in security, and make the unfortunate judgment that Tor shouldn't be used on that basis. What this graphic actually means is that Freedom House's survey respondents—on a purely anecdotal, non-random sampled basis—evaluated Tor to present "operational problems" while having fewer technical support resources available.2
Everywhere else in the report, this category of poll question is called "security and support," but for some reason, in the box summary, it's inappropriately reduced to just "security." Looking at the questions, the category referred to as "security" in the boxes actually represents survey respondents' views on usability and support—essentially whether or not users had trouble using or understanding the software, and whether or not there were resources to help them understand what was wrong. Usability and support are certainly important characteristics, but describing it as "security" is a gross misnomer.
The security ratings for the circumvention tools don't appear to heavily weight crucial elements of the design of the circumvention software system as a whole—in particular, whether or not the operators of the circumvention software have tracking or data collection capabilities over users of the software, and whether or not the source code of the tool has been made available for analysis.3 One baseline factor in evaluating the security of a piece of software is whether or not the widest possible community of knowledgable technologists has had the opportunity to identify defects, from design and architecture, down to the code itself. From a computer security perspective, most (if not all) software has exploitable flaws—taking advantage of those flaws to disrupt or control a piece of technology is more or less a matter of time and resources. And so there's a general understanding that any tool whose source code hasn't been made widely available doesn't have the benefit of having allowed broad research into the ways that it could be exploited, making claims of security essentially impossible to validate.
The report features a decision-making flowchart, where the resulting recommendation of software rests upon whether or not users are seeking to receive information or upload information; and also whether or not they're interested in speed or security. But without sufficient context—details buried in the written descriptions about software—users are being encouraged to conduct a risk assessment without the broad range of knowledge that may be necessary to make a truly improved decision about which circumvention software to use, and how to use it.
What are the essential take-aways?
Does the report deliver on its stated goals? As far as helping users assess a range of circumvention tools, the report's writeups about circumvention software projects do include valuable contextual details—such as that a software project is not openly documented or described, or that the operator of the software is able to log what its users are accessing. But the reductive star ratings and the conflation of survey content with lab research content throughout cast doubt on how beneficial this report will be to end users who don't read the report in its entirety, with an eye for the few caveats that establish the report's limitations.A second goal is to help "tools developers to learn how their tools are perceived by the users in these countries, and what enhancement would be beneficial." In this regard, the report could be beneficial if tools developers take the anecdotal survey findings and seek additional evidence to see if there are patterns that need addressing.
Ultimately, the Leaping Over the Firewall report seems to face a difficult internal contradiction: approaching circumvention tools from a largely non-technical perspective. The blocking of Internet content by governments and the circumvention of those blocks is a deeply technical topic where the adage that "code is law and architecture is policy" are powerfully validated.
However, there is value in attempting to identify and quantify what end users of circumvention software experience, and Freedom House's general finding that users will trade security for operational speed raises a number of vital questions about exactly why that choice is being made. Under what conditions does a user switch from a slow, highly secure channel to a faster, less secure channel? And for activists, when is an appropriate time to make that decision, and when should speed be sacrificed for security? The answer to these questions will help tool developers, activists, and users understand how to continue to have free expression on the Internet even and especially when faced with censorship.
- 1. EFF sponsored Tor early in its development because of its explicit, sophisticated focus on Internet anonymity, which EFF considers to be central to free expression.
- 2. The poll questions chosen by Freedom House leading to the "Security" star rating were:
- Problems: How often have you encountered operational problems using the abovementioned tools?
- Solutions: When you have encountered a problem, how easy was it for you to obtain help?
- Support Validity: How frequently does the help you find come directly from the tool’s developers or the tool’s network?
- 3. The technical testing methodology has a section for "logging practises," but is not clear how this detail was represented in the relatively non-granular star rating.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
