Thursday, 3 June 2010

Kenny Dalglish To Take Over as Liverpool FC's Caretaker Manager?

Papers Please


Governor Jan Brewer defends the new law as necessary for Arizona's immigration woes. She also says that when pulled over by police that a driver's license isn't enough to prove US citizenship. Does this mean all people driving in that state will have to carry birth certificates just in case the police don't think you look American?
MORE

Hello John, gotta new motor?

Spank!!! # 20

Gun control and ownership laws in the UK

Rafa Benítez conquered Europe with Liverpool but is now victim of owners' reign


(Thanx HerrB!)

Philip Selway to release solo album on Bella Union

Radiohead’s Philip Selway has announced plans to release his debut solo album on Bella Union records. To be called Familial, it’ll be released on 30th August and see’s Selway craft a singer-songwriter album rather than just a “drummer” side-project.
The idea of a solo album was apparently seeded when Selway played on Neil Finn’s solo project 7 Worlds Collide back in 2001. During the sessions for Familial, Selway invited Germano, Steinberg, Wilco drummer Glenn Kotche and multi-instrumentalist Patrick Sansone to come and make the record with him. All who were also involved in 7 Worlds.
@'The Line Of Best Fit'
 
"it's a beaut! a delightful surprise of a record."

Israeli Force, Adrift on the Sea

FOR 2,000 years, the Jews knew the force of force only in the form of lashes to our own backs. For several decades now, we have been able to wield force ourselves — and this power has, again and again, intoxicated us.
In the period before Israel was founded, a large portion of the Jewish population in Palestine, especially members of the extremely nationalist Irgun group, thought that military force could be used to achieve any goal, to drive the British out of the country, and to repel the Arabs who opposed the creation of our state.
Luckily, during Israel’s early years, prime ministers like David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol knew very well that force has its limits and were careful to use it only as a last resort. But ever since the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel has been fixated on military force. To a man with a big hammer, says the proverb, every problem looks like a nail.
Israel’s siege of the Gaza Strip and Monday’s violent interception of civilian vessels carrying humanitarian aid there are the rank products of this mantra that what can’t be done by force can be done with even greater force. This view originates in the mistaken assumption that Hamas’s control of Gaza can be ended by force of arms or, in more general terms, that the Palestinian problem can be crushed instead of solved.
But Hamas is not just a terrorist organization. Hamas is an idea, a desperate and fanatical idea that grew out of the desolation and frustration of many Palestinians. No idea has ever been defeated by force — not by siege, not by bombardment, not by being flattened with tank treads and not by marine commandos. To defeat an idea, you have to offer a better idea, a more attractive and acceptable one.
Thus, the only way for Israel to edge out Hamas would be to quickly reach an agreement with the Palestinians on the establishment of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as defined by the 1967 borders, with its capital in East Jerusalem. Israel has to sign a peace agreement with President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah government in the West Bank — and by doing so, reduce the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a conflict between Israel and the Gaza Strip. That latter conflict, in turn, can be resolved only by negotiating with Hamas or, more reasonably, by the integration of Fatah with Hamas.
Even if Israel seizes 100 more ships on their way to Gaza, even if Israel sends in troops to occupy the Gaza Strip 100 more times, no matter how often Israel deploys its military, police and covert power, force cannot solve the problem that we are not alone in this land, and the Palestinians are not alone in this land. We are not alone in Jerusalem and the Palestinians are not alone in Jerusalem. Until Israelis and Palestinians recognize the logical consequences of this simple fact, we will all live in a permanent state of siege — Gaza under an Israeli siege, Israel under an international and Arab siege.
I do not discount the importance of force. Woe to the country that discounts the efficacy of force. Without it Israel would not be able to survive a single day. But we cannot allow ourselves to forget for even a moment that force is effective only as a preventative — to prevent the destruction and conquest of Israel, to protect our lives and freedom. Every attempt to use force not as a preventive measure, not in self-defense, but instead as a means of smashing problems and squashing ideas, will lead to more disasters, just like the one we brought on ourselves in international waters, opposite Gaza’s shores. 

WikiLeaks' Sketchy Origins


The New Yorker has a fascinating new profile of Julian Assange, the mastermind behind WikiLeaks. Raffi Khatchadourian's piece is full of revelations about the enigmatic hacker-turned-"open-government activist", from details of his peripatetic childhood to an exclusive glimpse of Assange at work on the "Collateral Murder" video of an American Army helicopter shooting journalists and civilians in Baghdad.
Check it out—but also check out MoJo's controversial profile of Assange by David Kushner, which has just been updated and expanded. Like Kushner, Khatchadourian concludes that Assange's attempts to shine light on evildoers while lurking in the shadows is deeply contradictory: "The thing that he seems to detest most—power with accountability—is encoded in the site's DNA, and will only become more pronounced as WikiLeaks evolves into a real institution."
Perhaps the most interesting tidbit in the New Yorker story is its discussion of how WikiLeaks got its start. When WikiLeaks was in the planning stages in 2006, Assange said that he had more than 1 million documents; a claim that convinced Cryptome founder Jon Young that Assange was either exaggerating or up to no good. But now it seems that Assange did have his hands on a large, questionably obtained, cache of material. Khatchadourian reports that one WikiLeaks activist had access to a "tranche" of secret government documents obtained by Chinese hackers. The documents had been pulled off of Tor, the anonymizing network that WikiLeaks now encourages its leakers to use to stymie "internet spies." According to the New Yorker, WikiLeaks posted only a few of those swiped documents. If it's accurate, this anecdote raises some serious ethical and technical questions about how WikiLeaks operates. Does WikiLeaks condone this kind of online snooping? Has it relied upon it since its launch? Just how many of the senstive documents it's posted were genuinely leaked and how many were hacked?   
From Assange's response, the only thing that's clear is that (yet again) questioning WikiLeaks' M.O. makes him tetchy. He seemed to approve of the New Yorker piece, re-tweeting its assertion that "Some WikiLeaks documents were siphoned off of Chinese hackers' activities"—a detail that helps its noble-hacker mystique. However, after Wired looked into the Tor issue, Assange tweeted that its "beatup on WL&Tor" had "no new info": "Don't be fooled." The Register found this micro-denial "sketchy"; in a comment to the site, Assange implied that Wired and the New Yorker had gotten the Tor story wrong, but didn't elaborate on whether WikiLeaks had in fact gotten its start with documents taken from the privacy network.
Perhaps the New Yorker misinterpreted the geekery behind WikiLeaks; perhaps Khatchadourian got stuck in Assange's web of plausible deniablility. Either way, a more detailed response from Assange would go a long way toward clearing the air. As Ryan Sholin writes, "Is it OK to hack Tor in the name of the public good?...I have a hard time trusting Tor or WikiLeaks right now."
Dave Gilson @'Mother Jones'

However this comment is also at the page above:
First off, please take a little time to read my comment here:
http://ryansholin.com/2010/05/31/wikileaks-and-tor-moral-use-of-an-amora...
If you read that, I explain that Tor does not ensure (and has never promised to ensure) the security of the contents of data from point a to point b online. Tor obscures the origin from the destination.
The system is structured so that the exit nodes don't have to be trusted. If you read any of the Tor documentation, they tell you that. They tell you that anything you send over the wire unencrypted will come out for that last jump from exit-node to destination unencrypted, and anyone trying to intercept traffic at the exit node (the person running the node or an attacker) or the destination (the person running that service or an attacker) can read your stuff.
This is not news. On the other hand, your private information, including usernames/passwords, are probably in more danger on an open cafe wireless, where the kid next to you may be monitoring the unencrypted traffic on the wireless.
Mostly, we pay no attention to these things. But gosh, you'd expect Chinese hackers might have more incentive to take care? :)
Second, Assange says that something between a few and none of the materials published on Wikileaks came from the Chinese hacker monitoring. However the materials they did publish concerned documents outlining persecution of Tibetan activist NGOs and such. These organizations were warned.
This is a classic whistleblower scenario -- one I'd expect MoJo to understand. Any time there's a whistleblower, information is essentially stolen, violating some institution's security. This is true if it's Deep Throat spilling secrets to journalists he's sworn to keep. It's true if a chemical plant employee walks off with a manila folder with test results not meant for the public. It's true if someone takes information on a thumbdrive or laptop to present to the press or law enforcement. And it's true if someone intercepts a cell phone or internet data (whether or not from Tor).
All of these whistleblowers broke some form of security or confidentiality. I'm generally sorry when I hear that people are sniffing traffic from the Tor Network, but we know it happens, just as surely as we know somewhere right now, a sysadmin is reading someone's work email on an office server.
As we speak, there are activists, journalists, bloggers all over the world whose identity is being preserved by using Tor, writing in danger zones. Global Voices Online and Reporters without Borders are only two of the groups who train their people to use Tor to obscure the origin of their communications. They also teach people to use encrypted services (like https://gmail.com) rather than unencrypted services (http://gmail.com) so that end-to-end encryption will obscure the *contents* of their communication. Tor doesn't do that.
I'm former Tor staff, and a current volunteer. I spoke as executive director of Tor for a worldwide conference at Amnesty International (http://politics.gather.com/viewArticle.action?articleId=281474977022186), and was proud to be working with organizations including Human Rights Watch and many others during my tenure there. We focus on educating these people -- journalists, human rights activists, citizen journalists in countries where speech is not free, ...
We also document proper use of Tor to protect the user. However, my experience is that ignorant people will use Tor without protecting themselves or their data, and in the case of crackers, this can actually help law enforcement catch them. Although really *smart* criminals will use botnets and other more secure options than Tor, Tor remains the best solution for internet anonymity that doesn't involve stealing or exploiting someone else's computer or resources, and that is why it is in such widespread use among people who want to engage in civil disobedience, whistleblowing, or dissent.
You can learn more about who uses Tor, and why, here:
http://www.torproject.org/torusers.html.en
Assange stated pretty clearly that only a few whistleblower documents were published from Tor-sniffed hacking. Regardless of what you think of Wikileaks, dragging Tor through the mud just scares people away from a good resource, including people whose safety might eventually depend on their anonymity -- some successors of the Iranian election activists who used Tor to get media out of Iran, wherever that next need arises.
I'm no longer working on project staff, but I still do volunteer work for them. The way the media has engaged in scare tactics around something that isn't news (that exit nodes pass unencrypted content unencrypted) in a way that might scare someone into an insecure situation online, or drive them to use criminal means to protect themselves, makes me furious.
The Tor Project tried to make this into a teachable moment here:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/plaintext-over-tor-still-plaintext
I hope MoJo folks will learn more about Tor, and perhaps even support the project in the future. Feel free to contact me with any questions.
Sincerely,
Shava Nerad
Tor volunteer (not speaking *for* Tor)
shava@efn.org
Hazel Dooney DooneyStudio
RT @ThePunkRockShop Why do advertising creatives have way too much DJ Shadow in their iTunes libraries? Seems a universal trait. [LOL True!]